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It is shown that, with fixed transaction costs in the market for risky assets, investors with 
wealth below a certain threshold will hold pooled index funds that charge a proportional fee, 
rather than the market portfolio chosen by wealthier investors.  If a portfolio of closed-end 
index funds yields greater volatility of returns to investors than open-end index funds, and 
charges the same fees, the closed-end funds need to trade at a discount in equilibrium to 
attract buyers.  The same applies to actively managed funds if higher fees fully reflect extra 
expected returns from the managers’ skill.  In this case excess volatility is a sufficient 
condition for closed-end fund discounts.  It is unnecessary for discount risk to be systematic. 
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1.  Introduction 
The true explanation of closed-end fund discounts remains a matter of debate (see Dimson 
and Minio-Kozerski, 1999, for a survey).  One possible explanation is that the fees charged 
exceed the skill of the managers (Berk and Stanton, 2007; Ferguson and Leistikow, 2001, 
2004; Ross, 2002).  Although there is evidence in favor of this hypothesis, such as the 
tendency for discounts to be negatively correlated with past portfolio returns, which are 
likely to be treated as indicators of skill, there is also evidence that is not the whole story.  
For example closed-end index funds in the U.K. market trade at a discount even though their 
fees tend to be lower than on open-end index funds (Bleaney and Smith, 2010), and fund fees 
tend to decline with the age of the fund (Gemmill and Thomas, 2006), in contradiction to the  
pattern required to generate discounts in the model of Berk and Stanton (2007). 
 
The principal alternative explanation is that discounts represent compensation for the extra 
risk in holding closed-end fund shares associated with the variability of the discount itself.   
Lee et al. (1991) argue that closed-end fund shares are disproportionately held by noise 
traders, and that therefore discounts are subject to noise-trader risk.  To the extent that this 
risk is systematic, it will be priced and rewarded with a higher return, which is achieved by 
trading at a discount in equilibrium, so that dividend payments represent a higher percentage 
of the investor’s outlay.  Lee et al. (1991) provide some evidence that discount risk is 
systematic, but this is controversial and has been challenged by other authors (Chen et al., 
1993; Elton et al., 1998). 
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It is generally accepted that returns on closed-end fund shares are more volatile than returns 
on the funds’ underlying assets, even if much of this excess volatility is uncorrelated with 
market returns and so represents idiosyncratic rather than systematic risk (Pontiff, 1997; Sias 
et al., 2001).  Discounts also tend to move together (Bodurtha et al., 1993; Dimson and 
Minio-Kozerski, 1999; Lee et al., 1991), which implies that not only individual funds but 
also portfolios of closed-end funds experience excess volatility (in what follows we refer to 
this as “portfolio excess volatility”).  In other words excess volatility cannot be diversified 
away by holding a wide spread of closed-end funds.
1  The issue in previous research has been 
whether the closed-end fund discount risk is systematic (significantly correlated with market 
returns), which has been assumed to be a necessary condition for it to be priced.  Here we 
develop an alternative model in which all investors have identical expectations of the 
probability distribution of returns on risky assets, but face fixed transactions costs in buying 
and selling them.  The transactions costs provide a motivation for the existence of collective 
investment funds.  These funds run passive portfolios for a proportional fee, which is 
attractive to small investors because the fund enables them to pool transactions costs.  We 
show that, in this model, portfolio excess volatility is a sufficient condition for closed-end 
funds to trade at a discount, independently of whether the extra risk is idiosyncratic or 
systematic, provided that its fees are similar to those of an open-end fund.  This result arises 
from the fact that any investor either holds the market portfolio directly or through a fund, 
                                                 
1 Data supplied by the Association of Investment Companies show that for a portfolio of all UK conventional 
closed-end funds (excluding venture capital trusts) that are represented by the Association (as most are), the 
standard deviation of share price returns was 28.2% greater than the standard deviation of net asset value returns 
over the period 31 December 1999 to 31 December 2009. The portfolio is a weighted average based on market 
capitalization.   - 5 - 
 
but not both (except in special cases that can only occur when closed-end funds already trade 
at a discount).  If, however, it were the case that discounts did not co-move, the excess 
volatility on individual closed-end funds could be eliminated by spreading holdings across 
many funds, so that there would be no portfolio excess volatility and excess volatility in 
individual funds would not need to be rewarded with higher returns. 
 
2.  The Model 
We consider an overlapping generations model in which agents live for two periods, working 
and saving in the first period, and consuming in the second period.  Second-period 
consumption is financed by selling to the next generation financial assets that were bought 
from the previous generation in the first period.  In the first period agents must decide what 
portfolio of financial assets to hold. They are assumed to have a CARA utility function 




                    (1) 
 
where a (>0) is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.  Each agent chooses her portfolio 
allocation of her initial wealth (W) so as to maximize E(U). 
 
Assume initially that the available assets consist of one safe asset, with a certain net return of 
zero, and n risky assets, the net returns on each of which are normally distributed with an 
expectation of  (>0) and variance 
.  For simplicity we assume that all risky asset returns   - 6 - 
 
are uncorrelated with each other, so returns on the whole array of risky assets are N(, 
I). 
There is also a transactions cost of T in buying and selling each risky asset.  In a portfolio 
which consists of a proportion () invested in the safe asset and a proportion  equally 
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We assume further that agents cannot borrow, so  1    (This assumption is an artificial 
device necessitated by the CARA utility function, because without it small investors would 
always borrow whatever is necessary to hold the same portfolio of risky assets as large 
investors).  
 
Clearly there is a trade-off here between the reduction of risk through portfolio 
diversification and the extra transactions costs involved.  The portfolio decision of the agent 
consists of choosing  and m to maximize E(U). Using the formula for the expectation of a 
lognormal distribution and log-linearizing, we have: 
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 The first-order conditions of this problem are: 
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or exactly  2 a


 per asset.  Substituting (4) into (5), it becomes clear that, provided that there 
is an interior solution for , only corner solutions are possible for m: either m=0 (if 
22 2aT   ) or m=n (if 
22 2aT   ). Since the case of m=0  is uninteresting, we assume 
that expected returns on risky assets are always sufficient to offset the transactions costs and 
the risk (







   If W < X, then =1, and (5) is maximized with W given, which implies that 
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Equation (7) shows that, when wealth is relatively low, more of it is invested per asset if a 
and  are smaller (reducing the benefits of portfolio diversification) and if T is larger 
(increasing the costs of it).  Multiplying (7) by n and substituting the definition of X reveals 





, which is necessarily 
less than X if the condition that m > 0 is to be met. 
 
 
2.1  The Fund Industry 
Now we introduce a fund industry.  This industry offers agents the opportunity to invest in an 
index fund that holds equal quantities of all n risky assets for a proportional fee of f per dollar 
invested (with no transaction fee).  There is free entry to the industry, so prices are competed 
down to costs.  The assumed proportional fee corresponds to widespread practice in the 
industry, and also generates the empirically desirable prediction that funds are more 
attractive to small than to large investors.   Assume initially that the only funds offered are 
open-ended. 
 
A fund has the same portfolio variance as the market portfolio of n risky assets.  Because of 
this there is no incentive to hold a fund and the market portfolio, which would simply incur 
extra fees for no gain in portfolio diversification.  So the question is: when do agents hold the 
market portfolio and when do they hold a fund? 
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The answer is that the critical factor is the investor’s wealth.  There are four cases that need 
to be discussed separately.  If W  X, then an investor who holds the market portfolio (MP) 
holds X of risky assets.  This is, however, not true if she holds a fund instead, because the 
fees reduce the return for the same risk.  The holder of the fund chooses  to maximize: 
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This condition does not contain W because, in the region under consideration (W  X), 100% 
of marginal wealth is invested in the safe asset in either case.  We assume that (11) holds   - 10 - 
 
because otherwise every investor will hold the fund rather than the market portfolio.  Under 
this assumption, all investors with wealth of at least X will hold the market portfolio directly. 
 
Next we consider the second case, where wealth lies in the region 
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 in a fund 
and the remainder in the safe asset.
2  It is shown in the Appendix that the investor holds the 




2 ( ) 2
n




               (13) 
 










. Here the investor holds none of the safe 
asset, and the variance terms are the same, so it is simply a matter of comparing the fund 
management fees against the extra transactions costs of the market portfolio. Consequently in 
this case the market portfolio is held if: 
                                                 
2 The first inequality in (12) is a simplifying assumption which ensures that the agent holds all n risky assets if 
she does not prefer the fund.   - 11 - 
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 , in which case investors holding risky assets directly 










                (15) 
 
To summarize the four cases, provided that equation (11) holds, and that fund fees are not so 
large that the right-hand side of (15) is negative, there is a threshold value of wealth above 
which investors prefer to hold the market portfolio, or some subset of it, and below which 
they prefer to hold a fund.  This threshold is defined by (13), (14) or (15), depending on the 
exact values of the parameters. 
 
2.2  Closed-End Index Funds 
If closed-end index funds were offered to investors, would they have to trade at a discount to 
be competitive?  As mentioned in the Introduction, the shares of closed-end funds tend to be 
more volatile than the underlying assets.  A possible explanation is the additional element of 
noise-trader risk, as discussed by Lee et al. (1991).  Although the asset returns of all closed-
end index funds are 100% correlated with one another, the same is not true of the returns to   - 12 - 
 
holders of their shares, because the discounts on individual funds may move differently.  To 
the extent that discount movements are uncorrelated with one another, excess volatility can 
be reduced by holding a spread of funds.  Nevertheless we assume, in line with the evidence 
of discount co-movement referred to earlier, that if excess volatility holds for individual 
closed-end funds, it also holds for a portfolio of them.  The most important point is that we 
are not assuming that any of this discount risk is necessarily systematic (correlated with 
market returns) rather than idiosyncratic.  It is also possible that closed-end funds may charge 
lower fees than open-end funds, because they do not have to administer net sales and 
redemptions.
3 Consequently we assume that closed-end funds charge proportional fees of h 
( f  ). The return on closed-end funds is the market return, plus some element that reflects 
the initial discount (because this affects the ratio of dividend payments to price), plus a 
stochastic element related to the change in the discount. 
 





, where k > 1, although in general it is possible that closed-end fund shares are less 
volatile than open-end fund shares, in which case k < 1.  The expected rate of return on this 
portfolio may be written as  () h   , where  is an index of the equilibrium ratio of the net 
asset value (NAV) to price, and is equal to one if they are equal (zero discount), less than one 
if the price exceeds the NAV, and greater than one if the NAV exceeds the price. As in Lee et 
                                                 
3 In the UK market, closed-end funds do have lower total expense ratios than open-end funds, as discussed by 
Bleaney and Smith (2010), although there is less evidence of this for index funds.   - 13 - 
 
al. (1991), the greater expected return as  increases reflects the fact that the same dividends 
are received for a lower price.  So the issue is whether  has to be greater than one for closed-
end funds to compete with open-end funds.
4 
 
An investor holding a portfolio of closed-end index funds chooses  to maximize: 
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We shall focus on the two main cases: where W is high enough that agents are not 100% 
invested in risky assets, whatever type of funds they hold, and where W is low enough that 
they are 100% invested in risky assets in either case.  In the former case, the expected utility 
from holding an open-end fund is as given in (10): 
 
                                                 










, where P is the price and NAV the net asset 
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This implies that the portfolio of closed-end funds has the same Sharpe ratio as an open-end 
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which again shows that  will exceed one unless the lower fees on closed-end funds ( fh  ) 
are sufficient to offset excess volatility ( 1 k  ).  Thus in either case, if closed-end funds 
charge the same fees as open-end funds, portfolio excess volatility is a sufficient condition 
for them to trade at a discount.  It does not matter whether the excess volatility derives 
entirely from idiosyncratic discount risk or whether the discount risk is to some degree 
systematic. 
 
2.3  Large Investors and Closed-End Index Funds 
In this model it is possible that closed-end funds can be held by large rather than small 
investors, unlike open-end funds.  Suppose that discount risk is purely idiosyncratic, so that it 
can be diversified away.  Large investors holding the market portfolio can then enhance their 
expected returns, for no extra risk, by adding some closed-end funds whenever  () h     .   
Indeed, comparing this condition with (20), large investors will require a lower discount than   - 16 - 
 







5  If this condition holds, 
and closed-end funds are held by large investors, the discount will also respond to the 
systematic component of discount risk, which cannot be diversified away.  This does not 
change the prediction of the model that it is discount risk in general, rather than its systematic 
component, that explains the existence of discounts. 
 
2.4  Actively Managed Funds 
The closed-end fund market, in particular, is dominated by actively managed funds rather 
than index funds.  As noted by Bleaney and Smith (2010), a newly created closed-end index 
fund is unattractive to investors if it is expected to fall to a discount, and the ones that have 
existed in the UK market have tended to come into existence through a change of mandate of 
an actively managed fund that was already trading at a substantial discount.  Actively 
managed funds charge higher fees than index funds for the supposed skill of the managers. 
 
Suppose that actively managed fund j charges additional proportional fees of  j x , and 
investors expect returns of  j s  above that of an index fund.  Whether the variance of returns 
on actively managed funds exceeds that on index funds is something of an open question, but 
for simplicity we assume that the two variances are the same. 
 
                                                 
5 It is also true that as the fee on closed-end funds (h) tends to zero, large investors will arbitrage the discount to 
zero in this case.   - 17 - 
 
In the case of open-end funds, an actively managed fund will attract investors away from 
index funds if  jj sx  .  Unlike index funds, it may also attract large investors who would 
otherwise hold the market portfolio directly, if the additional return compensates for total 
fees ( jj s x f  ).  It could be argued that, if skill can be identified with any accuracy, and 
since managers are the monopolists of their own skill, they will raise  j x  to the level of  j s , in 
which case actively managed funds, like index funds, would only be held by small investors. 
 
In the case of closed-end funds, the discount can adjust for any difference between  j x  and  j s  
so as to equalize returns on actively managed and index funds.  Denoting  j   as the 
equilibrium ratio of NAV to price (equivalent to   as used above for an index fund), the 
expected return on the actively managed fund is  () j j j s x h     , compared with  () h    















               (24) 
 
Taking the case where wealth is high enough that agents hold a mixture of safe and risky 
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Thus different actively managed closed-end funds will trade on different discounts depending 
on the value of ( jj sx  ), and only if  jj sx   will they trade on exactly the same discount as 
an index fund.  Indeed if ( jj sx  ) is sufficiently positive, then  j   may be less than one, so 
that the fund trades at a premium, as happens in reality in a minority of cases. 
 
Theories of the discount based on the pricing of managerial skill, such as those of Berk and 
Stanton (2007) and Ferguson and Leistikow (2001), essentially argue that the discount exists 
because on the typical seasoned fund  jj sx  .  In our model, any such discount effect is 
additional to the discount that would apply to an index fund because of excess volatility.  
New funds can be created and sold at net asset value if the perceived skill of the managers is 
overestimated, as discussed by Ferguson and Leistikow (2004). 
 
3.  Conclusions 
The widespread belief that discount risk on closed-end funds has to be systematic in order to 
explain why the discount exists in equilibrium is a misconception that has arisen from the 
absence of an articulated model of portfolio allocation in the presence of collective 
investment funds.  In the model developed here, the element of discount risk that is common 
to all closed-end funds is reflected in the pricing of closed-end funds in equilibrium, even if 
this risk is uncorrelated with market returns and is therefore unsystematic.  If excess 
volatility of the returns to holders of a portfolio of closed-end fund shares (relative to returns 
to holders of open-end funds) is large enough to offset any cost advantage in operating a 
closed-end fund, closed-end funds will trade at a discount.  The reason why the   - 19 - 
 
decomposition of excess volatility into its systematic and idiosyncratic elements is not 
relevant is that funds are held by small investors who do not hold them in conjunction with 
the market portfolio; the only circumstances in which large investors might be tempted to 
hold closed-end funds in conjunction with the market portfolio is when they already trade at 
a discount. 
 
Any divergence between the skill of the manager of an actively managed fund and the price 
charged for it will be reflected in the discount.  To the extent that charges on seasoned 
actively managed funds tend to exceed the extra returns implied by managerial skill, as 
suggested by some theories, actively managed funds will on average trade on higher 




Berk, Jonathan B., and Richard Stanton (2007) Managerial Ability, Compensation, and the 
Closed-End Fund Discount, Journal of Finance 62 (2), 529-56. 
 
Bleaney, Michael F., and R. Todd Smith (2010) Managerial Skill and Closed-End Fund 
Discounts, Financial Markets and Portfolio Management 24, 441-51. 
 
Bodurtha, J., E. Kim and C. Lee (1993) Closed-End Country Funds and US Market 
Sentiment, Review of Financial Studies 8, 879-918. 
 
Chen, N., R. Kan and M.H. Miller (1993) Are Discounts on Closed-End Funds a Sentiment 
Index? Journal of Finance 48, 795-800. 
 
Dimson, Elroy and Carolina Minio-Kozerski (1999) Closed-End Funds: A Survey, Financial 
Markets, Institutions and Instruments 8, 1-41. 
 
Elton, Edwin J., Martin J. Gruber and Jeffrey A. Busse (1998) Do Investors Care About 
Sentiment? Journal of Business 71 (4), 477-500. 
   - 20 - 
 
Ferguson, Robert, and Dean Leistikow (2001) Valuing Active Managers, Fees, and Fund 
Discounts, Financial Analysts Journal 57, 52-62. 
 
Ferguson, Robert, and Dean Leistikow (2004) Closed-End Fund Discounts and Expected 
Investment Performance, The Financial Review 39, 179-202. 
 
Gemmill, Gordon and Dylan Thomas (2006) The Impact of Corporate Governance on 
Closed-end Funds, European Financial Management 12 (5), 725-46. 
 
Lee, Charles M.C., Andrei Shleifer and Richard H. Thaler (1991) Investor Sentiment and the 
Closed-End Fund Puzzle, Journal of Finance 46, 75-109. 
 
Pontiff, Jeffrey (1997) Excess Volatility and Closed-End Funds, American Economic Review 
87 (1), 155-69. 
 
Ross, Stephen A. (2002) Neoclassical Finance, Alternative Finance and the Closed-End Fund 
Puzzle, European Financial Management 8 (2), 129-37. 
 
Sias, Richard W., Laura T. Starks and Seha M. Tiniç (2001), Is Noise Trader Risk Priced? 





Derivation of (13) 
 
 The case under consideration is where 
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So that the investor either holds a mixture of a fund and the safe asset, or the market portfolio 
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In the latter case =1 and expected utility is: 
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The solution to this equation is: 
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where we have ignored the solution with W > X because it is outside the range under 
consideration.  The term in the square root is positive because we are assuming that (11) 
holds.  Since in the relevant range 
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it follows that investors choose the fund below the threshold value of wealth defined by (A4) 
and the market portfolio above it. 
 
Derivation of (15)
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Equations (A6) and (A8) are equalized when either W=0 or 
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which is greater so long as the threshold value of W given by (A9) is positive 
(i.e. 2 f aT   ).  Consequently the fund is chosen below the value of wealth given by (A9) 
and a portfolio of m risky assets above it. 